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What are the main causes of revolution? Discuss, with reference to the Revolutions in Russia and Iran

Every so often, a country experiences a revolution – an event that radically changes their very society, often creating new forms of government never seen before. But why do these revolutions happen? What conditions are required to precipitate such a tumultuous upheaval and restructuring? Russia and Iran are two countries that have experienced a revolution in the last century, each had a unique experience and the outcomes were very different. But what were the similarities in their revolutions?

Before we can understand the causes, we must first identify what a revolution is. What event or process occurred in Russia and Iran to clearly identify them as having had a revolution? Theda Skocpol defines this type of revolution as a social revolution, distinguishing it from rebellions, political revolutions and other societal changes. She specifically defines social revolutions as being “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures,” combining “societal structural change with class upheaval” and combining “political with social transformation[1].”

The Russian revolution fits well with this definition. Although the foundations of the revolution were built over many years, once the revolution began in 1917 the shift in power took less than a year - from the abdication of the Tsar in March 1917 to the Bolshevik coup in November 1917. It can be argued that the revolution actually began many years before with the first uprising in 1905, and that it only ended once the civil war had ended in 1921, yet in political terms 16 years is fairly rapid. The state and political structures were completely changed from an absolute monarchy to a communist state. The class structure moved from feudalism with peasants and workers at the bottom of the social order, to a society in which the peasants and workers became the ruling classes, in theory. The revolution was very much driven by a class revolt – from the peasants revolting and the soldiers mutinying in 1905 and 1906[2], to the workers revolting in St. Petersburg in February 1917[3]. Core to the revolution was the revolt of these classes against the aristocracy and the Tsar.

With regards to the Iranian revolution, it too was very rapid – even taking the revolution as beginning in 1977, with the letter writing campaign and lifting of some restrictions by the Shah, and concluding in 1980, with the first elected President, this is a period of only 3 years. The state structure was changed from a monarchy into a form of theocratic democracy. However the difficulty arises when trying to explain this revolution in terms of the standard Marxist class model – the class upheavals required by Skocpol’s definition. As evidence of a class uprising, one could look at the street demonstrations by the students in 1978; the closure of the Tabriz bazaar and protests of the bazaaris in April 1978; the working class strikes at the tobacco factory in February and at the steel factory and oil refinery in September 1978; and the army’s breakdown and declaration of neutrality in February 1979. However, the results of the revolution and the situation before the revolution suggest that class was not the driving force of the revolution. Iran had a constitution since 1906, and had experienced a democratic society from 1951 to 1953, when President Mossadeq led the country and the Shah was in exile. The aristocratic class in Iran was therefore very limited by the time of the revolution and many other classes had already formed in their society. Skocpol identified the dominant classes as the “state bureaucrats, foreign capitalist investors, and domestic capitalists[4].” If one looks to the shift in power and the key role players, we can identify why and who drove the revolt. Prior to the revolution, the Shah was the ruler of the country – he was resented more for being installed by the Americans, for his government and for his social policies than for his class position. During the revolution, although the Communist Tudeh and the Marxist Feday’in-e-Khalq groups both played a significant part, they made the assessment of it not being possible to raise a working class revolution. Their alternate policy of individual terrorism proved ineffective and eventually it was not them that led the revolution. The outcome of the revolution was the instatement of a religion based state system, not a worker led system. Rather than the classes having their position in society altered, the Iranian revolution changed the role of religion in government. The revolution was arguably driven more from a religious base than on a class base. Although looking at classes can be useful in analysing some revolutions, it is not always a defining aspect of a revolution.

Even as it is too narrow with its class limitation, the definition may also tend to be too broad in other regards. If one tests the events in South Africa at the beginning of the 1990’s against this definition, it may be considered to be a revolution, even though most people would not recognise it as such. From 1990 to 1994, South Africa underwent a rapid transformation from the racially divided apartheid form of government to a non-racial democracy. The black community, restricted by the apartheid government to only be part of the working class, has now become part of the ruling and capitalist classes. Once could therefore suggest that South Africa does fall within Skocpol’s requirements, in fact she even suggested that South Africa might be a candidate for revolution in 1979[5]. In my opinion, the key difference is that the changes took place as a compromise and through negotiation, rather than a forceful overthrow. The state structures in South Africa never collapsed or broke-down, but instead were transformed and changed. In Russia and Iran, the previous governments were completely dissolved and replaced by the new. The revolutionaries broke down the existing state structures and replaced them with their own. It can therefore be argued that a social revolution involves not only a transformation of state structures, but also a breakdown of existing structures and a replacement with new.

There is one more aspect that is perhaps missing from Skocpol’s definition. In 1953 there was a coup in Iran that resulted in the Shah being reinstated. In a very short time, Iran was changed from a constitutional democracy back to an absolute monarchy. This can only be called a “rapid, basic transformation of a society’s state and class structures” – the state changing from democracy to monarchy, and the class structures being returned to the Shah at the top with foreign capitalists playing a bigger role. Yet this is normally referred to as a coup and not as a revolution – Skocpol herself does not even define it as a revolution[6]. What Skocpol neglects to emphasise is that revolutions are about people rising against an unpopular leader or government. In Russia, it was the peasants and workers that rose against the Tsar and the nobility. Tsar Nicholas II was an unpopular leader – his reforms were not fast enough and he was fighting an unpopular war. In Iran, the people and the clergy rose against the unpopular Shah. The Shah was not a recognised leader of the people, his policies were very unpopular, and he was seen as a puppet of Western capitalists, in particular the Americans.

My definition of a revolution would therefore be as follows:

“A revolution is a successful, popular uprising against an unpopular government, resulting in the breakdown and rapid, basic transformation of the society’s state and social structures.”

Russia and Iran fit into this definition as discussed before, but South Africa does not because there was no breakdown in structures, and Iran’s coup does not because it was a popular government being replaced by an unpopular one.

Once we have defined what a revolution is, we can start looking at what causes them. Firstly it requires something to revolt against – an unpopular government. In Russia, there was much about the Tsar and the aristocracy to breed popular discontent. The Tsar and his family lived a life of opulence and extravagance unrivalled by any other monarchy. Amongst their riches, there were massive palaces, including the Winter Palace and the Moscow Kremlin; incredible jewellery, like the Faberge Eggs and clear-water diamond pieces for their horses; gilded carriages; imperial trains; and other items of sheer ostentatiousness. Their tercentenary celebrations in St. Petersburg were a huge display of this wealth, with a massive electric light show, processions and celebrations. Contrasted against this were the peasants who owned no land and lived in abject poverty. The Tsar seemed unwilling to part with his empire, instead, as Figes argues[7], he attempted to return it to its previous glory and escape into it. Meanwhile, the peasants were crying for more reforms. The slow pace of reform had culminated in the massacre outside the Winter Palace in 1905 and the subsequent protests that almost removed the Tsar from the throne. To quell this rebellion, the Tsar was forced to make several reforms between 1905 and 1912, but by 1917 he had once again fallen behind in meeting demands for reform. The First World War also did much to hurt the Tsar’s reputation – Russia suffered several defeats during the war, Russian casualties and prisoners were in the millions, the army had all but lost its capacity to fight, and the Tsar had in effect made himself personally responsible by assuming Supreme Command of the armed forces[8]. The Empress too was highly unpopular, and she did little to make herself popular. Her attitude is summed up well in her correspondence with Queen Victoria, when she says that “we do not need to earn the love of the people. The Russian people revere their Tsars as divine beings, from whom all charity and fortune derive[9].” Her dealings with Rasputin, led to rumours of an affair and suggestions that Rasputin was in fact ruling the country.

In Iran, the Shah too led a highly unpopular government. As he was instated by a CIA backed coup in 1953, he was very much a puppet of America. Under his rule, Iran became a “’rentier state,’ awash with petrodollars, and closely linked to the rhythms of the world capitalist economy[10].” This Western influence was seen by many as a threat to their identity. Although the oil led to much wealth and employment in the country, especially during the OPEC oil crisis in the early 1970’s, the drop in demand from 1976 resulted in a contraction of the economy and loss of many jobs. Together with this, there was high corruption and a growing income gap between those with access to oil revenues and those without. During his rule the Shah made several unpopular decisions against the clergy, in attempt to reduce their power – including land reforms, and modern education and welfare programs[11]. In response to this the Shah became branded as anti-Islamic, something that Ayatullah Khumayni play upon. The Shah did nothing to counter this allegation and in fact made it worse with his support for Israel, and his modernisation policies, which included banning the wearing of burkhas by the Muslim women. His human rights record was terrible, with many politic prisoners in custody. Even the American government began to raise human rights concerns in 1977. The response to the protests in 1978, which included the killing of protestors and the declaration of martial law, culminating in Black Friday on the 8 September, further increased his unpopularity.

The next requirement of a revolution is a popular uprising. Although the unpopular government will often create spontaneous uprisings and demonstrations, it is the coordination and organisation of these uprisings so that they are able to overthrow the government that is crucial. This is the key to a revolution, and it requires good leadership, a common goal, willing support, coordination and a great deal of momentum.

In Russia, the key person in the revolution was Lenin. Lenin was a great intellectual and had great strength in character. Lenin “enjoyed an unqualified authority which was based not upon the fear which he inspired nor upon the patronage which he could dispose, but upon the respect in which his unrivalled intellectual and polemical gifts were held.[12]” He was supported by other great intellectuals and organisers, especially Trotsky, and had the Bolshevik party as his platform and support base. Even though the Menshevik party enjoyed more support than the Bolshevik party, and even though Lenin spent many years in exile, he was still able to exert strong leadership and develop the revolution. In the period between the March and November revolutions, he entered into a contest through the Bolshevik party with the provisional government – criticising them and challenging their decisions at every opportunity. Through his slogans and his criticisms of the government that closely matched the feelings of the masses, he was able to gain much support of the people. The Bolsheviks targeted the bottom classes – the soldiers, the peasants and the workers. These were the masses and were generally poorly educated. The Bolshevik slogans, like “all power to the Soviets”, appealed directly to them through their simplicity. The Bolsheviks were able to incite and unite the lower classes by calling on their key grievances and offering them support. They developed and grew the popular uprising, and were also able to control it enough so that they were able to release it when the key moment to seize power arose. The November revolution and ousting of the provisional government was very quickly and efficiently executed.

In Iran, the early phases of the revolution were mostly driven by Ali Shariati, who pioneered the concept of revolutionary Islam. Shariati was able to lead the students into protest and to start a popular uprising. As Rahnema and Nomani state, “the importance of Shariati lies in his popularization of a radical and revolutionary Islamic subsystem. Shariati’s subsystem appealed to the university students who had always constituted a forceful centre of opposition to the Shah’s régime[13].”. However once the uprisings had begun and Shariati had been lost, the leader that excelled in coordinating the uprising was the Ayatullah Khumayni. He spoke out frequently against the government, which eventually led to his temporary exile, and he encouraged the clergy to join the revolution when it was just beginning in 1977. Khumayni made very effective use of the Mosques as a platform to coordinate the revolution. Even when he was in exile, he was able to relay his message to the people through smuggled tapes that were played in the Mosques. His revolutionary platform was of pro-Islam, anti-imperialism, which was a very popular standpoint, since most of the people were unhappy with the Shah’s anti-Islamic policies and America’s influence in the country. Islam is also the predominant religion in Iran, and it was a very effective shared belief on which to unite the popular uprising.

Even though a popular uprising has formed against an unpopular government, there will still be no revolution unless they can succeed in breaking down state structures. If the state is stronger than the revolutionaries, the revolution won’t be successful. In Russia, the ongoing war had significantly weakened the state. St. Petersburg was left virtually undefended towards the end of the war, as all available men were sent to the front. The Tsar was completely involved in fighting the war and had even left the choice of government ministers to his wife, as a result “in the first two years of war, four prime ministers, three foreign ministers, three defence ministers, and six ministers of the interior came and went[14].” The soldiers used in the suppression of the demonstrations became less and less dedicated, and eventually by February 1917 they had had enough and sided with the protestors. By then the government was so unpopular, and the Tsar so helpless that he eventually was forced to abdicate in March. The provisional government that followed also lacked strength. They continued the unpopular war, and still did not have any forces left in the cities to defend themselves. By November, only the Winter Palace had only form of defence. As Trotsky recounts:

“Demonstrations, street fights, barricades – everything comprised in the usual idea of insurrection – were almost entirely absent … To be sure, the thing was not after all settled without fighting. The Winter Palace had to be taken by storm. But the very fact that the resistance of the government came down to a defence of the Winter Palace, clearly defines the place occupied by October 25th in the whole course of the struggle. The Winter Palace was the last redoubt of a régime politically shattered during its eight months’ existence, and conclusively disarmed during the preceding two weeks[15].”

In Iran, the government was arguably very strong. The military and police forces were still at full strength and the government in effect had the support of America. But this was to no avail, as many soldiers in the army felt solidarity with the protesters. In the protests in January 1979, the army experienced a split when soldiers refused to fire upon demonstrators and instead joined the demonstrators. Without the full support of the armed forces, the Shah’s power was waning fast and he fled into exile, instating Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar as a provisional prime minister. Eventually in February 1979, conflict broke out between the Imperial Guard and the Air Force cadets at the Doshan Tappeh Garrison, and two days later the army declared itself neutral. The depth of his unpopularity, and the effective mobilisation of protests and popular support against him were the Shah’s undoing – his forces being subverted from under him. In Iran it was the strength of the popularity of the revolutionaries that was superior to the strength of support for the government, rather than strength of physical forces. The popularity of Ayatullah Khumayni allowed him to take power the very same day that the army declared itself neutral.

And finally once the existing structures have been broken down, there must be a transformation of state and social structures, else there would only have been a change in leadership, and not a revolution. Central to this is the goal of the revolutionaries and their ideologies. What the revolutionaries were fighting for and what they were fighting against will shape this transformation. In Russia, it was a revolt primarily driven by the peasants and workers. The ideology of Karl Marx, socialism and communism were those most prominent at the time and was the ideology of Lenin and the Bolshevik party. The ideology was a complete reversal of the existing situation – rather than having the Tsar at the top, and the peasants and workers at the bottom of the order, Marxism instead suggested that peasants and workers should own the means of production and therefore be at the top. This ideology resulted in a new style of government that was named communism.

In Iran, the revolt was led by the clergy, in particular Ayatullah Khumayni. The revolution was targeted against imperialism and anti-Islamic practices, and the Ayatullah’s ideology that the clergy should play an active role in government was the one that led and shaped the revolution. The result of this was a new form of theocratic democracy. The clergy play a significant role in government, creating an Islamic state, with Islamic policies and laws.

Therefore four factors are crucial for a successful revolution – if any one of the factors are absent, there will not be a revolution. Firstly there must be an unpopular government or leader, which will lead to people calling for change. This is the starting point and the catalyst for the revolution, without an unpopular government, a revolution cannot even begin. Secondly, there must be a popular uprising. If there is no uprising, if the uprising is not strong enough, or if there are no leaders to direct these uprisings, the government will not change. Thirdly, the existing government must be weak enough to be broken-down. If the government is too strong, the revolution will just decay into a protracted guerrilla war, as was the case in apartheid South Africa and is arguably the case in the Israel/Palestine conflict. And finally the result must be a change in state and social structures. If there is no change, then it is merely a coup or a change in leadership.

[1] Skocpol T., States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pg. 4

[2] Figes O., A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924, Jonathan Cape, London, 1996, pg. 57

[3] Kochan L. and Abraham R., The Making of Modern Russia, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983, pg. 286

[4] Skocpol T., Social revolutions in the modern world, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pg. 240

[5] Skocpol T., States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pg. 16

[6] Skocpol T., Social revolutions in the modern world, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pg. 244

[7] Figes O., A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924, Jonathan Cape, London, 1996, pg. 20

[8] Kochan L. and Abraham R., The Making of Modern Russia, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983, pg. 282, 283

[9] Figes O., A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924, Jonathan Cape, London, 1996, pg. 26

[10] Skocpol T., Social revolutions in the modern world, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pg. 244

[11] Ibid, pg. 248

[12] Stephenson G., A history of Russia: 1812-1945, Macmillan, London, 1969, pg 293

[13] Rahnema A. and Nomani F., “According to Shariati”, in The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics and Economic Policy in Iran, Zed Books, London, 1990, pg. 54

[14] Kochan L. and Abraham R., The Making of Modern Russia, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983, pg. 283

[15] Trotsky L., History of the Russian Revolution – Volume 3 translated by Chris Russell, Marxists Internet Archive, 2000, pg. 217