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Outline the major changes brought about by Lazaro Cardenas. Did his sexenio make a contribution to Mexico’s later democratisation; or did it detract from democratic development?

Nominated by Calles, because he expected him to be easily manipulated[1], Cardenas instead radically changed Mexico and in many ways carried on the revolution that started in 1910. His style of government became know as Cardenesmo and set the stage for the next 60 years of Mexican history. But did his 6 years in government and the changes he made create or destroy the possibility of democracy in Mexico?

The first major change that Cardenas instituted in Mexico was to redistribute land on a massive scale amongst the peasantry, and thereby break the power base of the hacienda landowners. Much of the groundwork had been done by his predecessors in terms of identifying the land, but whereas they had only redistributed 17 millions acres, Cardenas was able to redistribute 41 million acres in his sexenio[2]. In line with his quasi-socialist views, he used the ejido system of communal land ownership. The land could no longer owned by a single person, nor could it be traded or consolidated, and therefore land-ownership could no longer be a source of power, thus breaking the hacienda power system. The ejido system also allowed large amounts of land to be shared amongst the maximum amount of peasants – over 800 000 peasants benefited from the distribution[3]. To support the distribution, Cardenas also implemented plans for the education, health and finance of these ejido communities.

The land distribution made Cardenas extremely popular with the peasantry, but did it add to democracy within Mexico? The ejido system broke down the traditional enclaves of the haciendas, which definitely improved democracy. The hacienda was a very concentrated form of power, whereas the ejido system is a distributed form of power. The ejidos allowed the peasants to have more control over their lives, and a say in local governance. However, it can be argued that because the ejido system did not allow for the private ownership and transfer of land, it prevented the development of large-scale commercial farming. According to Skidmore, the system resulted in production falling in several areas and no long-term benefit[4]. Large-scale farming would have released more people from the rural areas in the cities, and urban populations are generally more politically active than rural populations. The tying of peasants to the land and the restrictions imposed on Mexico’s farm development may have limited the development of democracy in Mexico.

The second major change made by Cardenas was the nationalisation of the oil and rail industries. In 1937, Cardenas nationalised the Mexican rail system, which was predominantly owned by foreign investors. But more importantly, in 1938 he nationalised the oil fields. The oil was mostly owned and controlled by American firms. The companies paid the Mexican workers very poorly, and there was a longstanding wage-dispute with the firms. Finally the Mexican courts found in favour of the workers, but the foreign firms defied the ruling and continued to operate as before. Cardenas chose this as the moment to expropriate the oil in terms of Article 27 of the Mexican constitution. The foreign firms protested loudly over this, but were compensated by the Mexican government[5].

The nationalisation of oil was one of Cardenas’ most popular decisions. It was seen as a political victory over the ‘gringos’ and instilled a sense of national pride in the Mexican people. The compensation for the foreign firms was raised through a massive public contribution[6], and because of this, people felt that they had a stake in the oil industry and that it was now truly Mexico’s. Nationalism is arguably an essential component of an effective democracy – if people have a strong sense of national identity, they will be more supportive of and participate more in government. Also government that is seen to be meeting popular demands (as was the case with the oil) will attract more support and participation by ordinary people. The more people participating in a government, the more democratic it can become.

The third way in which Cardenas changed Mexican government was in his leadership style. Before he was elected, Cardenas travelled over 17 000 miles, visiting peasants and workers and listening to their problems[7]. He showed a genuine interest in people’s problems and tried to make himself open and accessible. Rather than being aloof from the population (as his predecessors generally were), Cardenas supported and helped the farmers and workers – distributing land and even supporting the striking workers. Furthermore, although he was a General, he chose not to wear a military uniform as president, and instead wore a suit and tie. This challenged the Mexican tradition of the military playing a strong role in government.

The changes in government style created a good environment for democracy to flourish. Cardenas’ attempted inclusion of everyone’s interests (especially the peasants and workers) in his approach and policies is a potentially democratic approach – Gill describes this as “progressive corporatism[8]”. Making himself accessible and listening to people’s problems and concerns could also been seen as big step towards democracy. Cardenas made a very big step away from Mexico’s militaristic, authoritarian past towards a civil-service type government. Unfortunately leadership style is generally something unique to a person, and Cardenas’ style was not followed by his successors. Although Cardenas’ style was very democratic, it was not entrenched into Mexico’s government system.

However, Cardenas’ fourth major change was to the government itself and had a huge impact on Mexico’s future. In 1935, a year after Cardenas’ election, there were over 500 strikes happening in Mexico. But rather than attempting to clamp down on these strikers, Cardenas built a strong alliance with Crom and instead supported their strikes. This was the beginning of Cardenas’ co-option and corporatism strategy. He helped the trade unions form a single union in 1936 – the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM). Then in 1938 he helped the peasants form the National Peasant Confederation (CNC). These unions were then brought together by Cardenas in 1938, when he changed the name of his party to Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM) and co-opted them into government[9].

In the corporatist system that Cardenas so created, there were 4 sectors – the workers (CTM), the peasants (CNC), the middle-class (CNOP) and the military. In closed-door sessions these four sectors debated issues and worked out compromises between them, all under the directorship of the PRM and the president. This “revolutionary family” became the centre of power in Mexico – if you wanted something to be done, it was through this structure[10]. From the population’s point of view, membership in these sectors was automatic, involuntary and singular (people could only belong to one sector at a time).

The question is whether the new style of government contributed to or detracted from democracy in Mexico. In many ways it did create a potential environment for democracy. Firstly it gave a voice in government to many people who did not used to participate – the peasants for example. Since the majority of the country’s interest groups (with the exception of the capitalists[11]) were represented and had an equal say, it is in its ideal form a democratic style. Secondly, the type of government was in many ways uniquely Mexican, which increased national pride and established an identity for Mexico. As discussed early, nationalism may be a necessary part of democracy. Thirdly it tamed the military. Mexico had a very militaristic past, and the military traditionally played a very strong role in government. Because of this, military interference in government was always a threat, for example a military coup. Because Cardenas included the military into this government structure and also introduced salaries and regular promotions, the military leaders were slowly replaced by the burocratas políticos[12].

Lastly, the corporatist system contributed significantly to Mexico’s political stability. Still recovering from their revolution and suffering from the Great Depression, Mexico had the potential of breaking down into a second revolution. Corporatism brought all the groups in Mexico together that might separately have caused much trouble. Rather than protesting their demands on the streets, raising the crowds and creating instability, the groups were given a direct part in government decision and were forced to work out compromises with the other groups. The corporatist system was also divided along on functional lines, rather than geographic lines. This shift away from geographical government removed the threat of regional warlords returning to power. Considering Mexico’s violent and turbulent past, the creation of stability was something of a miracle. Political stability itself is vital to the formation of democracy, since democracy itself does not create stability (and may even create instability) and will potentially break down in an unstable environment.

However, as Mexico’s political record after Cardenas shows, corporatism did not create an environment in which democracy could develop. Firstly, corporatism centralised power within the PRM and the sectors and made it difficult for opposition parties to form. People relied on their sector to deal with their problems, since membership in a sector was involuntary and all disputes and differences had to be dealt with in your own sector. Opposition parties, independent unions or other non-governmental organisations were therefore unable to contribute in any significant way to government[13]. The co-option of the unions into government also serves as a permanent electoral base for the ruling party[14], making it very hard for an opposition party to win votes. Since a democratic society is based on open competition and choice between political parties, the lack of an effective opposition was a big obstacle to democracy.

Secondly, since the PRM oversaw the sectors and the president led the PRM, the president became to be seen as unquestionable. A strong civil society, and the constant questioning and accountability of leaders is another cornerstone of liberal democracy. Thirdly, corporatism and the co-option process led to a corrupt culture of patronage politics in Mexico[15]. A system of favours and patronage restricts the choices and actions available, detracting from democracy.

Lastly, the sectors became victims to Michel’s “Iron Law of Oligarchy[16]”. The sectors were oligarchic in nature (whereby power is concentrated in a few people), and its leaders began to assert their dominance by displacing organisational goals. Fidel Velázquez as leader of the CTM is an excellent example. Although he was highly unpopular with the workers themselves, he was able to hold his position for many years by being friendly to the government. His leadership earned the name of charrounionism or sell-out unionism[17]. This was another problem with corporatism, in that leaders of the unions were not chosen very democratically.

Cardenas did much for Mexico in his rule, had his successors carried on with Cardenesmo, perhaps Mexico would have evolved into a full democracy. Unfortunately Cardenas’ social philosophy did not become an integral part of government and the corporatist system was too easily corrupted. Instead of promoting it, the system was able to hold off the possibility of democracy for decades. Finally the system became so corrupt and twisted that it turned against the principles fought for in the revolution. But in this failure of the system, Mexico finally asserted its democracy – rather than succumbing to another revolution, the PRI (formally the PRM) was ousted through elections in 2000. The ultimate outcome of Cardenesmo may yet be democracy.

 [1] La Botz D., Democracy in Mexico, South End Press, Boston, 1995, pg. 55

 [2] Wolf E., Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, Faber and Faber, London, pg. 45

 [3] Skidmore T. and Smith P., “Mexico: The Taming of a Revolution” in Modern Latin America, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, pg. 240

 [4] Ibid, pg. 240

 [5] Ibid, pg. 241

 [6] La Botz D., op cit., pg. 85

 [7] Ibid, pg. 54

 [8] Gill A., Comparative Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000

 [9] Centano M., The Autonomous Bureaucracy, 1994, pg. 53

 [10] Hellman J., Mexico in Crisis, London, 1978, pg. 100

 [11] La Botz D., op cit., pg. 57

 [12] Centano M., op cit., pg. 54

 [13] Hellman J., op cit., pg. 98

 [14] Levy and Bruhn, 2001, pg. 73

 [15] Hellman J., op cit., pg. 101

 [16] Michels R., Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Emergence of Leadership, the Psychology of Power, and Oligarchic Tendencies of Organisations, Dover Publications, New York, 1959

 [17] Hellman J., op cit., pg. 108