Pete’s blog

In your opinion, why has the Middle East been a region wracked by conflict and instability? Is this state of affairs likely to continue or is the Middle East on the brink of a new era of democracy, peace and stability? Why?
(Use 3 mini case studies of your choice to support your answer)

The Middle East has been a region wracked by conflict and instability both in ancient times and in the modern age. Birth place of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, it is historically, culturally and religiously important to a large portion of the world’s population. Being one of the centres of ancient civilization, it is home to a wide range of people, cultures and languages. It is a land where the vital resources of water and arable land are both in short supply, yet the strategic resource of oil is in abundance. The competition between the various peoples of the region to determine their own destiny and to control the limited resources is one source of the conflict; the role of outside powers to control the people and more importantly the oil is another. But there is currently hope for an end to the conflict, for a new era of cooperation, peace and democracy. Arab countries that once sought the destruction of Israel, now scramble to be peacemakers between the Israelis and Palestinians. A creation of an independent Palestinian state is now seen as an inevitability, rather than a remote possibility. In Lebanon, the people have challenged their government to increase its democracy and independence, and have successfully brought an end to 30 years of Syrian occupation. And America has begun a great experiment in Iraq, hoping that if they can bring democracy to Iraq, other Arab countries will be inspired to follow the example.

Israel and the Palestinians

The recent death of Yasser Arafat is seen by many as a critical turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although an icon of the struggle, he became increasingly ineffective as leader of the Palestinians and as a peace negotiator. In part this was due to his reluctance (and possible inability) to exert his power and authority over the militant Palestinian organisations, his reluctance relinquish his powers and to bring necessary reform to the Palestinian Authority, and his apparent lack of vision and ability to unite the Palestinian people in a single voice. It was also in part a result of Israel’s view of him as a terrorist and supporter of terrorism. Under effective house arrest by Israeli troops in his compound during much of the second intifada and with his increasing isolation by Israel and America, Arafat had limited scope in which to act or negotiate.

The election in January 2005 of Mahmoud Abbas as the new Palestinian leader brings new leadership, and someone less likely to be stuck in the past or be haunted by the past. The critical question is whether Abbas is a strong enough leader and the right man for the job. So far Israel has been willing to talk to and negotiate with Abbas, and Abbas has been able to obtain a tentative and shaky ceasefire from the militant groups. Abbas has had a long history with the Palestinian struggle, being one of the founding members of Fatah. He was a key negotiator at the Oslo peace talks and has been involved in most of the peace negotiations since. He also spent four months as Palestinian Prime Minister, until disagreements with Arafat over control of the security forces led to his resignation. He therefore brings much experience with him and a deep understanding of the issues. He was even the head of the Palestinian team that met in secret with an Israeli team led by Yossi Beilin in Stockholm in 1995 to determine a “permanent status” agreement regarding the creation of a Palestinian state under the Oslo Accords. One wonders if Abbas may once again present this agreement as a solution, that in the words of Yossi Beilin was a “document with a complete, or nearly complete solution to the 28-year-old conflict and perhaps 100-year-old conflict[1]”. Potential problems may arise with regards to Abbas’ views of the refugees and their right of return – himself born in Safed, Galilee and in effect a refugee. His view is that “everyone should first be granted the right of return, but then we have to sit down and discuss the details that have to be jointly agreed upon and mutually acceptable to both sides.[2]“

The refugee problem and their right of return is a key stumbling block in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Thousand of Palestinians were displaced by the 1948 War of Independence and further by the Six Day War of 1967 – many of the refugees are now third generation. The right of refugees to return to their homes is seen by many as a fundamental human right, but in the case of the Palestinians the possibility seems remote. As at 30 June 2003, the UNRWA (The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) had over 4 million registered Palestinian refugees[3]. If all of these refugees were to return to Israel, the demographics of Israel would be fundamentally altered and threaten the Jewish character of the state – an issue of utmost importance to every Israeli Jew. The ability of Israel to even support and accommodate such large numbers of refugees is questionable. Even if a compromise is reached and a limited number of refugees are allowed to return to Israel, the question remains of what to do with the vast majority of refugees. Some form of compensation and assistance in settling either in the new Palestinian state or their current country of residence would have to be offered. It is unlikely that Israel could afford the cost of such compensation, and funding would therefore have to come from another source. Since almost half of the refugees are located in Jordan, planning and financing to relocate these refugees would be required, or the agreement of Jordan to offer citizenship to these people. The refugee problem currently seems insurmountable. If the Palestinians take the approach that they will accept no agreement with Israel until the refugees are taken care of, it is possible that a Palestinian state may never be created. Creating a Palestinian state first and then dealing with the refugees might be the only way forward.

Another major obstacle to peace is the matter of the Jewish settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. Considered by most as illegal under international law and the Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention[4], the issue is hotly debated. About 230 000 people live in 145 settlements[5], which is less than 5% of Israel’s population of over 6 million[6]. Yet, Ariel Sharon’s current efforts to remove the fewer than 10 000 settlers in the Gaza Strip have resulted in protest marches, court challenges and some violence. The problem is one of ideology and religious beliefs. Many Israeli Jews see Israel as having a biblical claim on the whole Land of Israel (Eretz Israel) including the West Bank and Gaza. Settlers are therefore seen as pioneers taking back land that belongs to Israel, and the settler movement tends to attract religious extremists. Going against people’s religious beliefs is difficult for most states, but for Israel, whereby the character of the state itself is grounded in religion, the difficulty is far greater. If the settlements are dismantled, Israel also faces the expensive problem of relocating and compensating the settlers. It seems unlikely that any wholesale removal of settlements in the West Bank will take place or many concessions will be made by Israel regarding the settlements. The future Palestinian state’s borders will in all likelihood be drawn around these settlements. But many proposals that accommodate the majority of the settlements yet require only 5% or 6% of the West Bank land have already been proposed, including the negotiations between Beilin and Abbas[7], and a proposal by Bill Clinton[8].

In many ways the border of the future Palestinian state has already been defined, all that remains is for it to be drawn. One wonders whether the Palestinian’s allegation that Sharon’s “security fence” is an attempt to draw a de facto border is correct. Sharon himself was the principle architect of the “big plan” that resulted in Israeli troops circling Beirut in June 1982, where a 40km incursion into Lebanon was all that was expected[9]. Could Sharon once again be hiding a “big plan” under a more innocuous one? The “security fence” is an ambitious plan and ironically creates many possibilities for peace, even as it brings more suffering and hardship to the Palestinians and condemnation from the international community. By creating a physical barrier, a very clear message is sent to the settlers – “If you are on our side of the wall, we will protect you, but if you are on the other side of the wall, you are on your own.” It also creates a very strong point of negotiation for Israel, clearly defining the land that Israel considers vital to its security. Furthermore if negotiations continue to breakdown, Israel has the option of declaring the “security fence” its border and completely divorcing itself from the Palestinians. And as an added benefit it gives Israelis a sense of security from suicide bombers. The language in Sharon’s “disengagement plan” (in particular its first principle) seems to indicate that in the absence of progress he will take unilateral measures and wants to give Israel the option to act unilaterally if necessary[10]. The “security fence” may be part of another of Sharon’s “big plans” to unilaterally resolve the Palestinian issue.

The problem that Israel faces is that it is running out of time. The Palestinian population is growing faster than the Jewish population and will soon be in the majority. This is a situation that Israel cannot afford to be in, both because of the public relations nightmare of being a minority occupying (and arguably oppressing) a majority, and because of the risk of the Palestinians calling for a single state democracy (and thereby destroying the Jewish character of Israel). Within Israel itself, the population is living under the constant threat of violence, a situation that is degrading their society’s fabric and is costing millions of dollars in security. Tourism and trade have been seriously affected by the second intifada and ongoing violence, severely restricting Israel’s economic growth. International pressure is mounting on Israel, America especially needs a resolution in Israel to further George Bush’s plans for democracy in the Middle East. With all these factors working against them, Israel has to find a resolution as soon as possible.

The remaining two major obstacles to peace are the matters of security for Palestine and Jerusalem. Bush, keen to see a resolution to the conflict, has offered that the “United States will help the Palestinian Authority build the security services that current peace and future statehood require[11].” With America’s support and with Arafat no longer exerting his iron grip over the Palestinian security forces, progress is likely to be made in developing a Palestinian security force acceptable to both the Israelis and the Palestinians. As for the matter of Jerusalem, being the centre of much religious and personal feeling, only long negotiations and compromise will find a solution. However, as with all aspects of the final resolution, Israel should be careful that the terms are seen to be fair and just. If Israel exerts too much of its will and forces a settlement that is perceived as unjust, violence could erupt again.

The Israel-Palestinian conflict appears to be on the threshold of being resolved. Israel has a strong leader who has been able to challenge the resistance in his own party and has begun to take decisive steps to resolving the conflict. The Palestinians has a very experienced negotiator as a leader, a man who has already argued the terms for peace several times and understands the issues involved. Frameworks and plans for the “final status” already exist, people know what needs to be done, all that is required is the will to take the difficult steps. Although the creation of an independent Palestinian state seems so near, the future relations between Israel and Palestine will determine how long the peace lasts. In the words of Avi Shlaim:

“An independent Palestinian state is inevitable. It will be weak, demilitarized, and territorially divided. The real question now is whether Israel will give the Palestinians a chance to build their state or strive endlessly to weaken, limit, and control it.[12]”

Lebanon

On the northern border of Israel is a country that has experienced more than its fair share of conflict and instability. Lebanon’s turbulent past has been intimately tied into the conflict in the region, and present developments may have a huge impact on future regional stability. Having just under 4 million people, made up of a mixture of Sunni, Shi’ite, Christian and Druze populations, in an area smaller than Swaziland[13] has created much internal tension and resulted in a 15 year civil war that ended only in 1990. It has been occupied by Syrian forces since the outbreak of this civil war, ostensibly to keep the peace; and also, until 2000, by Israeli forces in the south. Being a major base of operations for the PLO and Hezbollah, Israel has raided and invaded Lebanon several times – most famously “Operation Peace for Galilee” in 1982, in which Israel laid siege to Beirut, and “Operation Grapes of Wrath” in 1996 which was a massive assault against Hezbollah positions described as “the equivalent of using a bulldozer to weed a garden[14].”

Although they have been able to hold successful regular elections since the end of the civil war, Lebanon is still faced with many political problems. Since its occupation, Syria has exerted strong pressure and influence over Lebanese politics. Syria’s connection to Lebanon goes back to the days of the Ottoman Empire, but more recently to the period after the First World War. At the time the Arabs were pushing hard for a Greater Syria, including the area of current day Lebanon and Syria. However the Lebanese Christians ended up declaring independence, and in order to bring a rebellious Syria under control, France shrank the Syria’s borders in favour of Lebanon[15]. Many people in both Syria and Lebanon still feel a very close bond between the two countries. However a large group of Lebanese are not as happy with Syria’s occupation and see Syria has having too much power and influence of their politics. International pressure has also been growing in recent years for Syria to withdraw its troops – the UN Security Council passed a resolution in September 2004 demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon. Shortly after this, the Lebanese parliament extended President Emile Lahoud’s term by amending the constitution. As Lahoud is pro-Syrian, and the extension was supported by Syria, this move led to much in-fighting between the pro-Syrians and the anti-Syrians. Rafiq Hariri, the prime minister at the time and seen as a champion of the anti-Syrian movement, left the government as a result.

The assassination of Hariri in February 2005 brought all these tensions to the boil. Although responsibility for the assassination has not yet been established, massive rallies calling for the immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops began shortly after his death. The on-going rallies and international pressure led to the resignation of the prime minister’s cabinet. Syria also buckled under the pressure and began the withdrawal of their troops, which is expected to be completed by the end of April. Although their troops will no longer be in Lebanon, Syria may still continue to wield significant influence in Lebanese politics. To the outside world seeing the rallies of hundreds of thousands of people, it appeared as if Lebanon was united in their demands for freedom from Syria. But many of the pro-Syrians were intimidated and fearful of the size and ferocity of the anti-Syrian demonstrations, and only recently have the pro-Syrians taken to the streets “fed up with what the opposition is saying[16]” with rallies also numbering in their hundred thousands. Lebanon’s government now hangs in a state of limbo – Prime Minister Omar Karami has been unable to form a new government and tendered his resignation on 13 April. With the current parliament’s term running out at the end of May, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that a cabinet will be in place to call for the required general elections.

Regionally Lebanon has potentially huge implications, particularly regarding Syrian-Israeli relationships. Israel and Syria are still in a state of war with each other, the main impediment to peace being the Golan Heights. Israel has been in occupation of the Golan Heights since the 1967 war and officially annexed the land in 1981. The continued occupation and annexation of the Golan Heights is disputed by Syria (and much of the international community) and violates the principles of United Nations Resolution 242. The majority of Israelis do not support withdrawal from the Golan Heights and it is estimated that the cost of compensation for Jewish settlements in the area will be in the region of $10 billion[17]. With their withdrawal from Lebanon, Syria loses one of their important negotiating points with Israel – that of agreeing to withdraw from Lebanon and no longer pose a threat on Israel’s Northern border. If Israel refuses to give up the Golan Heights and Syria feels that it cannot negotiate, then Syria may resort to military action. Although Syria would not be able to maintain a sustained battle with Israel’s superior military, a quick action designed to gain as much land as possible and to initiate international intervention may be successful. Syria will have approximately 16 000 extra troops available once they withdraw from Lebanon, which could be used in such an attack. Syria’s main problem would be their lack of international support, as they are still perceived as harbourers of terrorists and are currently unpopular for the occupation of Lebanon, and such action is therefore unlikely, but still possible.

Until a new government can be formed, it is difficult to determine what Lebanon’s future will be. The fact that the majority of the population have resorted to protest marches, rather than militancy and violence, bodes well for democracy and stability. The holding of parliamentary elections, which are seen by the population as being free, fair and representative, are vital to future stability. The future relationship with Syria will also play an important role – the creation of normal diplomatic relations may go far in showing that Syria recognises Lebanon’s full sovereignty and independence[18]. One feels that if Lebanon is able to resolve their differences and solve this problem politically (without any significant intervention by an international power), maybe other conflict-ridden countries can do the same.

America and Iraq

When America invaded Iraq in March 2003, it was under the banner of pre-emption – invading to destroy a perceived weapons-of-mass-destruction threat. By all appearances, George Bush expected this to be a quick win – go in, secure the oil, be hailed as liberator, put a government in place and then leave. However by November, six months after Bush had declared major hostilities over, more American soldiers had been killed after the “end” of the invasion than during the invasion[19]. A violent guerrilla insurgency greeted the United States forces, rather than hordes of cheering crowds. It took a year for America to handover power to a transitional Iraqi government in June 2004, and rather than a grand ceremony with parades, the affair was conducted under heavy security and secrecy. Under such attack, it became a matter of saving face for America. Any withdrawal before securing peace in Iraq would be seen as a victory for the insurgents, would severely damage America’s international credibility and would not be received well by the American voters. An unstable Iraq would also become a host to terrorist organisations and increase the threat of America’s current greatest enemy. America’s priority in Iraq switched from finding weapons of mass destruction, to securing freedom and democracy for Iraq. Rhetoric changed from removing dictators that threaten peace and security, to bringing the light of democracy to the Middle East.

Almost two years after the invasion began, Iraqis went to the polling stations to elect their own government. Due to a relatively peaceful poll and high voter turnout, it was hailed as a victory for democracy. In April 2005, the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani was elected as president and an inclusive government was formed with a vice president from each of the Sunnis and the Shias. Even though Sunni voter turnout was small, every effort to incorporate them in the new government has been made. US military official are claiming that the insurgency is weakening fast[20], and the Iraqi security forces are gaining in numbers, providing security at 5 000 of the polling stations at the elections[21]. On the surface, everything looks hopeful for Iraq’s democratic future.

One of the biggest threats to peace in Iraq is the US army itself. They are the primary target of the insurgents and are seen by many as a hostile occupying force. The majority of Iraqis want the Americans to leave now that a government is in place, and more alarmingly the majority of Sunnis see the violence as legitimate resistance[22]. America has done little to bolster the opinion of their forces in Iraq, with the abuses of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Graib prison, and stories of heavy handedness in Falluja[23]. Even coalition forces are getting weary of the US, with Poland, Holland, the Ukraine, Bulgaria and Italy all planning or carrying out troop withdrawals. Italy, being the fourth largest contributor of forces to Iraq, and one of the strongest supporters of Bush, decided to withdraw its troops after US troops killed an Italian intelligence agent and wounded the freed hostage he was escorting[24]. America may soon find itself alone in Iraq if it continues to alienate its allies. Iraq is draining the US military as well, with levels of new recruits dropping off and supplies being exhausted[25]. America is running out of time in Iraq – if they are unable to secure the peace or transfer security duties to the Iraqis soon, their mission in Iraq will become increasingly difficult and expensive. Into the future, it is vital the America should withdraw as many of its troops as possible. Any troops left behind run the risk of being accused of interfering in government and of being a target for terrorists or insurgents.

America’s future political involvement in Iraq may be the second biggest determinant in Bush’s plans to bring democracy to the Middle East. As Stephen Zunes suggests:

“Iraq cannot be pro-American without being at least somewhat autocratic and it cannot be democratic without being at least somewhat anti-American. The United States can have an Iraq that serves as a key strategic ally and close economic partner or it can have an Iraq with a legitimate representative government. Unless there is a radical change in U.S. policy, it cannot have both.[26]”

America has already experienced what happens when a government in the Middle East is seen to be illegitimate and pandering to the Americans – the Iranian revolution did much to breed anti-American sentiment in the Middle East. If the Iraqi government is not seen as legitimate by the people and if conditions for the people on the ground do not improve, Iraq runs the very real risk of following a similar path to Iran. One questions whether America has the foresight or character to allow the Iraqis to government as they see fit, and one wonders what would America’s response be, if the Iraqi government decides to start transferring contracts from American appointees to local people in order to tackle unemployment and poverty. With widespread accusations of incompetence and corruption amongst the American contractors, a slow rate of delivery and high unemployment in Iraq, it would be a sound decision for most observers. However the American contractors would not give up their lucrative contracts easily and would strongly oppose any such efforts. A government perceived to be illegitimate would have severe and far reaching consequence for America. It would likely increase anti-American sentiment, promote terrorist organisations, increase the risk of Iraqi civil war and would put an end to the notion of America being the great democratiser.

The government of Iraq faces many problems of its own. Although voter turnout was relatively high, it was severely marred by the lack of Sunni participation. Unless all groups can be brought into formal government, the ongoing violence and insurgency will likely continue and the threat of a civil war looms. The government in most respects is and will be a government of compromise. Unfortunately this may cripple and immobilise the government if compromise cannot be reached. The delays in forming the government have left many Iraqis already feeling disillusioned[27]. Already divided into the Kurds in the North, the Sunnis in the middle and the Shi’ites in the South, and with voting tending to follow ethnic lines, the risk of Iraq fragmenting in a violent civil war is very apparent. The Kurds, who already have been able to settle their differences and form a democratic government of their own (with very little outside assistance), may attempt to form a separate Kurdistan if no progress is made in Iraq or if a civil war breaks out. Having experienced virtual autonomy since the First Gulf War, they already have the forces and the government structure to do so. However at the present, they are very keen supporters of a united Iraq and a Kurd has also take the office of president of Iraq. As such the likelihood of them taking such action is currently remote.

The fate of Iraq hangs very much in the balance, although the scales seem to be tipping towards a peaceful solution. An effective, legitimate government and a limited future role of America in Iraq are vital to securing this peace. Weighing against the peace is the lack of trust between the three main groups, especially the suspicion with which the former ruling Sunni minority is viewed, and the ongoing insurgency movement.

The current events in the Middle East are intricately related. If America is successful in Iraq, they will be more willing and able to exert pressure on other countries, including Israel, Lebanon and Syria. Failure in Iraq may undermine any American involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, and possibility the complete break-down of the talks. If Israel secures an agreement with the Palestinians, it may improve America’s image in the region, strengthening their efforts in Iraq and other countries. Peace and democracy in Lebanon may result in regional cooperation between Israel, Lebanon and Syria, and in turn a resolution to the Golan Heights issue and peace between Israel and Syria. Civil war and violence, however, may draw Israel and Syria back into conflict.

Although the world’s eyes are currently turned to the unfolding situations in Israel, Lebanon and Iraq, the resolutions of these conflicts alone will not bring peace and stability to the Middle East. More than anything else, what the Middle East needs is cooperation and trade between the countries; economic development for the majority and not just a select few; and more representative democratic governments. The Arab Human Development Report 2004 from the UN, has the following accusation:

“By 21st century standards, Arab countries have not met the Arab people’s aspirations for development, security and liberation despite variations between one country and another in that respect … There is a near-complete consensus that there is a serious failing in the Arab world and that this is located specifically in the political sphere.[28]”

So it is not just the resolution of specific conflicts, but the meeting of people’s aspirations that will be important. If the Palestinians have a state of their own, but still live in poverty, conflict could start anew. The Iraqis need jobs and their infrastructure rebuilt, just as much as they need an effective, representative government. The region may be on the verge of creating a peace, but it will take economics to secure the peace.

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 [1] Shlaim, A. The Iron Wall, Penguin Books, London, 2001, pg. 554-555

 [2] “Profile: Mahmoud Abbas”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1933453.stm, 10 January 2005

 [3] “Total Registered Refugees Per Country and Area”, http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/statis-01.html, 30 June 2003

 [4] “The Geneva Convention”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1682640.stm, 24 August, 2004

 [5] “Settlements List”, http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=57, 1 April 2005

 [6] The World Factbook 2004, the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, 2004

 [7] Shlaim, A. Op. Cit., pg. 555

 [8] Makovsky, D. and Benedek, E., “The 5 Percent Solution”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story172.php, September 2003

 [9] Shlaim, A. Op. Cit, pg. 406

 [10] “Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon – Revised”, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/DisengageSharon_eng_revised.htm, 28 May 2004

 [11] Bush, GW. “President Discusses War on Terror”, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050308-3.html, 8 March 2005

 [12] Shlaim, A. Op. Cit., pg. xiv

 [13] The World Factbook 2004, the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, 2004

 [14] Shlaim, A. Op. Cit., pg. 560

 [15] MacMillan, M. Peacemakers, John Murray (Publishers), London, 2002, pg. 418

 [16] “Lebanon: Pro-Syrians speak”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/4358559.stm, 24 March 2005

 [17] “Regions and territories: The Golan Heights”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/3393813.stm, 1 October 2004

 [18] “Syria, Lebanon urged to set up ties”, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/0030AC83-68D8-4DA0-8844-03AFB9080057.htm, 6 April 2005

 [19] “Timeline: Iraq”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/737483.stm, 7 April 2005

 [20] Schmitt, E. “Insurgency Is Fading Fast, Top Marine in Iraq Says”, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/19/international/middleeast/19marine.html, 19 March 2005

 [21] Bush, GW. Op. Cit.

 [22] Zogby, J. “The challenges facing post-election Iraq”, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=12646, 9 February 2005

 [23] “Journalists tell of US Falluja killings”, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6890A8DA-AF79-45AD-BB4F-42C060978A07.htm, 20 March 2005

 [24] “Italy Plans to Pull Troops Out of Iraq”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37189-2005Mar15.html, 16 March 2005

[25] Tyson, AS. “Two Years Later, Iraq War Drains Military”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A48306-2005Mar18?language=printer, 19 March 2005

[26] Zunes, S. “How much power will the new Iraqi government really have?”, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=12671, 11 February 2005

 [27] “Many Iraqis Losing Hope That Politics Will Yield Real Change”, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/17/international/middleeast/17voices.html?pagewanted=print&position=, 17 March 2005

 [28] Boncompagni, H. “UN warns of chaotic upheavals in Arab world”, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=13140, 6 April 2005