Pete’s blog

In the post-Cold War era, as during the Cold War, NATO has successfully expanded its membership and partnership agreements to encompass the entire European continent. Yet, has this created greater security for NATO member states or further complicated and made NATO less useful as a political and military alliance able to respond to the challenges of the 21st Century? Analyse and discuss, supporting your answer with evidence.

Now more than 50 years old, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has outlived its Soviet rival, the Warsaw Pact, and continues to reinvent and redefine itself. The world has changed significantly from the bi-polar ideological Cold War, to a multi-polar world threatened by terrorism. In recent years NATO has expanded its membership so that it covers most of Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea. This expansion has brought both new challenges and new possibilities for NATO, but has it really increased security for the Alliance members and will it ensure the continued relevance and existence of NATO? With 50 years of experience, NATO excels at consensus building and the command and coordination of multinational military operations. The world would no doubt be the poorer without such a forum for discussion and cooperation, but will NATO continue to fill this role?

When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 it was in the shadow of both the Second World War and the threat of Soviet expansion. The possible rise of a resurgent Germany was foremost in the minds of the Europeans, in particular the French, having faced the Germans twice in half a century. Under the leadership of Stalin, the Soviet Union had, in the words of Winston Churchill, descended an iron curtain across the continent and Western governments were fearful of Soviet encroachment. The Europeans knew that they needed America to keep both the Germans and the Soviets restrained, and the Americans knew that they had to support Europe to prevent the spread of communism. The objectives of NATO were summed up in the phrase “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down” – words attributed to the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay[1]. NATO was highly successful in the ensuing Cold War, as a forum for the coordination of Western security policy and for European defence – so successful that it named itself “the most successful defensive alliance in history[2].”

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Empire completely changed the security situation that existed for most of NATO’s life. During the Cold War, NATO’s primary threat and concern was the Soviet Union, almost all its effort had been devoted to planned responses to Soviet aggression. Without the Soviet Union, NATO lost its primary threat and focus, and many people wondered whether it was still a relevant alliance. However, NATO was founded on a treaty “written so that it could be understood by a milkman from Omaha[3]” and was based on principles of stability, well-being, peace and security, rather than on containing a specific threat. This simplicity and flexibility allowed NATO to reinvent itself and move forward. The groundwork for NATO’s transformation was laid as early as 1967 in the “Harmel Report”, which advocated détente towards Eastern Europe and stated that “the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.[4]” This was developed further by the 1990 “London Declaration” that recognised that “the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours” and identified the need to “reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship[5].” At the time of the “London Declaration” the Warsaw Pact was still in existence and the possible expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe was not mentioned. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact a year later, expansion under Article 10 of the Treaty became a definite possibility. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 was the first step, acting as a forum for consultations between NATO members and the former Soviet republics. Next came the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1993, followed shortly by the Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became the first East European countries to join the NATO Alliance. In the same year the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched to assist other aspiring countries in joining NATO. In 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO in the fifth round of enlargement.

It can be argued that the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe is one of the key reasons for NATO’s continued existence. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, peace and stability in the former Soviet republics was of primary concern both to Europe and America. NATO was able to provide the NACC forum for discussions through which these concerns could be addressed. This developed into the PfP programme, though which the Alliance could take an active role in the stabilisation and restructuring of the Eastern European military structures, with the carrot of future NATO membership being used very effectively to encourage the countries to join and cooperate. If NATO did not involve and seek to integrate Eastern Europe into its structure, it would most likely have become another legacy of the Cold War. The former Soviet countries would have seen it as an exclusive club of the West and treated it with suspicion and contempt. Without a focus or purpose the Alliance would have begun to fragment and would most likely have suffered its final mortal blow either with the recent spat over the Iraq war or with European Union ambitions of their own collective defence.

The question though, is whether the enlargement of NATO has indeed created greater security for member states, or whether it is in reality a desperate attempt to justify its own existence and a poison pill that will lead to its eventual downfall. The last two rounds of enlargement have increased NATO from 16 countries to 26 countries. In an organisation built around the principles of consensus building and where every member has an effective veto vote, the increased membership raises the risk of a stalemate or deadlock being reached. However the Alliance is resilient against such problems, a stalemate or deadlock does not mean the end of the Alliance. If consensus cannot be reached within the NATO structure, then action may be taken independently of NATO. Even the attempt at building consensus and the discussion of issues with the NATO forum increases the degree of cooperation possible, increases understanding between nations and reduces the risk of dangerous, unilateral decisions or actions. After the 9/11 attacks, most NATO members were willing to invoke Article 5 of the Treaty, whereby an attack against one is considered an attack against all. However the United States chose not attack Afghanistan under NATO, but formed a separate alliance. This did not weaken NATO, instead NATO now provides the peacekeeping and stabilisation forces to Afghanistan in the form of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The new members in NATO are also unlikely to be the countries causing deadlocks or stalemates, rather it will be ideological differences between the main founding members – as illustrated by the differing opinions about the invasion of Iraq which saw mainly the United States and United Kingdom at loggerheads with France and Germany.

Another risk of introducing new members is that of free-riders and of disproportionate cost sharing. Once a country is a member of NATO they are a member until they decide to leave. There is no sanction or expulsion mechanism in the Treaty to deal with members that do not fulfil their obligations or participate in activities. So while the PfP and MAP programmes have specific goals and requirements for the countries to meet before they are granted membership, once they are members of NATO they can act as they please. European Union (EU) membership or the prospect of EU membership has played a significant role in limiting this risk and there has as yet been no overt back-sliding or non-cooperation by the new members. The Eastern Europeans also bring small, outdated and inexperienced military forces, and limited budgets with which to expand their forces. The European forces of NATO were already embarrassingly weak and ineffective in comparison to the American forces prior to enlargement, together spending 40% less on defence than the Americans. This was clearly illustrated in the Kosovo campaign of 1999, European NATO members only expended 7% of the precision-guided munitions and flew 30% of the air support missions[6]. The inclusion of new members only increases this shortfall in European defence capability, as the area to be covered is far larger and the new members do not bring any increase in capabilities. However, as pointed out, the European defence shortfall is a problem affecting most of Europe and it is not a wholly a consequence of the enlargement. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was launched in1999 in an attempt to close the gap, but progress has so far been slow.

In spite of the above concerns, the new members appear to be willing to contribute and participate where they can. The Czech Republic hosts and leads the Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Battalion[7], and Poland is leading a stabilisation division in Iraq with the assistance of NATO[8]. The new members have also been willing contributors to the operations in the former Yugoslavia, and to the ISAF in Afghanistan. It should also be questioned whether it is better to have these countries inside or outside of the Alliance. Including them in the Alliance gives direction and purpose to their militaries, and brings them under the NATO command structure. Having them outside of the Alliance increases the risk of an unstructured, unreformed and directionless military instigating a coup or inciting a civil war. The potential for a country to pursue its own military ambitions or to turn rogue are also curtailed by their inclusion into NATO. From this point of view, NATO’s enlargement has undoubtedly increased the security of its member nations.

The expansion has however raised concerns in countries that have not been included. In particular, Russia has been particularly opposed to NATO enlargement, seeing NATO as a former enemy taking over its old backyard. The possibility of Russia ever joining NATO is very small, the primary argument being that it is not an Atlantic country, but also the complications involved in including such a vast country are currently insurmountable. Nevertheless, every effort has been made to include Russia in NATO initiatives, Russia even being a member of the PfP since 1994. In 1997 the “NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security” created a formal basis for NATO-Russia relations and in 2002 the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was formed. Although the NRC is not the same as full membership in NATO, it does involve Russia in the decision-making processes of NATO to an almost equal degree. Whether this will be enough to placate Russia or whether Russia will continue to feel threatened by NATO in the future, has yet to be shown.

At the same time as NATO has been expanding, so too has the European Union. Having formed a common market and a monetary union, it is inevitable that the EU will look to creating either a defensive force of its own or an alliance between the members, in order to defend its borders and to promote security and stability within these borders. NATO has for the meanwhile been able to fulfil this need, as there is a large overlap between EU and NATO members and more importantly most of the recent new members of the EU were first members of NATO. The desire and need for a European defence agreement has already created some tensions in the Alliance. The “gang of four” (Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg) made a suggestion for the establishment of an EU operational planning staff, which would allow the EU to conduct autonomous operations. For the Americans and most of the other Alliance partners, this was seen as an initiative to undermine NATO. The draft EU constitution also contained clauses for mutual assistance and structure cooperation, further worrying Washington that the EU would become a rival to NATO[9]. Although much work has gone into smoothing over relations and assuring the Americans that any EU structure will operate in cooperation with NATO, the fact is that the EU will at some stage have to form its own defensive alliance. The main reason for incompatibility is that some countries are members of the EU, but not NATO, for example Austria, Sweden and Finland. A European defence arrangement under the banner of NATO would not be possible, since involving non-NATO members in the NATO command structure raises questions of secrecy, cost-sharing and participation in joint action. Although the expansion into the East has prolonged NATO’s relevance and compatibility with the EU, there will eventually come a time when the EU’s own security ambitions take precedence over NATO.

Enlargement has extended the life of NATO, giving it new life and relevance to Europe. By enticing Eastern European countries with NATO membership, the Alliance has encouraged reform in these countries and created stability and security. Undoubtedly a policy of inclusion, discussion and cooperation will lead to greater security, as opportunities for misunderstandings are reduced, goals and strategies are aligned, and common interests are identified. With the new members, the NATO-Russia Council and the ongoing Partnership for Peace, NATO has played a crucial role in promoting peace, stability and security in Europe. The threats to NATO come not from its enlargement but from a changing United States foreign policy and the development of the European Union. NATO itself might one day become obsolete, but it is sure to be replaced by a similar organisation, based on a similar treaty and similar principles. Future developments will decide whether it will be a European alliance, an EU-US alliance or a vast EU-US-Russia alliance.

[1] Ortega, A. “Are the challenges NATO faces today as great as they were in the Cold War” NATO Review, Winter 2003, pg 20

 [2] “The London Declaration”, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b900706a.htm, 10 July 2000

 [3] Lord Robertson, “Change and continuity” NATO Review, Winter 2003, pg 2

 [4] “The Harmel Report”, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm, 5 July 2000

 [5] “The London Declaration”, Op. Cit.

 [6] Russell, R. L. “NATO’s European Members: Partners or Dependents?” Naval War College Review, Winter 2003

 [7] “Launch of NATO Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion”, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p031126e.htm, 5 December 2003

 [8] “Poland assumes command of multi-national division in Iraq with NATO support”, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-093e.htm, 3 September 2003

 [9] Grant, C. “Reviving European defence cooperation” NATO Review, Winter 2003, pg 8