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A lack of transparency regarding China’s defence modernisation has raised suspicions in East Asia and the US. Beijing’s rapid and sustained increase in defence expenditure suggests a long-term objective to dominate East Asia and the Pacific. Discuss.

 

Concerns have recently been raised about the growth and modernisation of China’s military. Combined with a lack of transparency in Chinese politics, East Asia and the United States are fearful that China intends to dominate the East Asia and Pacific region in the long term. As the most populous nation and with one of the fastest growing economies in the world, it would appear that China’s dominance over the region is inevitable. More concern should therefore be given as to how China intends to dominate and what it will use its influence for. With opaque internal politics, an increasingly restless population, complex border disputes and multifaceted relations with other countries, it is of paramount importance to understand which instruments of policy China will most likely employ to resolve disputes.

China’s growing dominance

China has the largest population in the world at roughly 1.3 billion people and in terms of land area, is one of the 5 largest nations in the world – roughly the size of the United States of America.[1] These two features alone should in theory be enough to secure China’s influence and position in the world. However, China in modern times has been a poor agrarian country, and after the communist revolution of 1949 the government became insular and reticent. Although China showed no hesitation in using its power regionally, for example in the Korean War, it generally had little interest or ability to participate in international affairs, particular under the shadow of the giants of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. The poorly planned “Great Leap Forward” of Chairman Mao Zedong led to massive famine from 1960 to 1961 in which millions died, whilst the Cultural Revolution at the end of the 1960’s led to unrest and political disorder. Both of these events kept China’s attention focused inward and did little to further its economic growth. The death of Chairman Mao in 1976 and the introduction of Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies marked a turning point in China’s economic fortunes[2].

For more than a quarter of a century, China has been able to maintain one of the highest economic growth rates in the world – the average annual GDP growth rate since 1978 has been 9.4%[3]. Currently the GDP growth rate is estimated at 9.5%[4]. Foreign trade in the same time period has grown from $20.6 billion to $851 billion[5] – China is now only behind the United States and Germany in terms of world trade[6]. This phenomenal growth has attracted much interest from investors, making China the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world, surpassing America in 2002[7]. Goldman Sachs estimates that China’s GDP will exceed Japan’s in 2016, making it the largest economy in Asia, and will exceed the United States’ in 2041, making it the largest economy in the world[8].

These statistics seem show that China is already a major player in not only the Asian economy, but the world economy too. However, the reality on the ground is that China is still considered a developing nation, with a GDP per capita of only $5000[9]. In particular, 60% of the population are still rural and have an average income of less than $1 a day[10]. China is also a newcomer to many of the international financial institutions, only becoming a member of the World Trade Organisation in 2001[11]. Even though they are one of the largest economies in the world, they are not yet a member of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised countries, although they were invited to the recent 2005 summit at Gleneagles[12]. China does however give the impression that it prefers to associate itself with the developing world rather than the traditional G8 developed nations. China sees it as “the fundamental standing point of [it’s] foreign policy to strengthen its solidarity and cooperation with numerous developing countries.”[13]

Even though they are relatively new, China’s influence is growing rapidly. Regionally it recently signed a trade agreement with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which could result in one of the largest free trade regions in the world[14]. China has also been seeking to obtain sources of much needed commodities and to gain support for its policies by building stronger ties with Africa[15] and spreading its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean[16]. China’s growing international investments and trade have been less well received in the developed world – a Chinese oil firm was recently forced to withdraw its bid for an American oil firm, due to hostility it faced in the US[17], and many countries are unhappy about the flood of cheap Chinese goods, particularly textiles[18].

As China’s trade and wealth grows, and as it become further integrated into the world economic system, its economic influence and power can only but grow. If the current trend continues it will achieve full economic dominance over the East Asian region in just over a decade.

China’s potential influence in the political and military domains will increase with its economic might. Militarily, if China spends only 1% of its GDP on defence, it would in theory be able to support a military equal to that of Japan by 2016. This would be a conservative approach, since Japan’s military is limited by its constitution to a purely defensive role[19] and China has no such limitations – currently China is estimated to be spending between 3.5% and 5.0% of its GDP on defence[20]. As China’s GDP increases and as it becomes increasingly industrialised, China will have more resources available to improve its military. If it is effectively modernised and equipped and if China’s spending rate is maintained, its military will rapidly surpass that of Japan, giving it the most powerful military in East Asia. If we disregard conventional military forces, China still has the rare privilege of legitimately and openly holding nuclear weapons. Their nuclear arsenal is the third largest in the world, with approximately 20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)[21]. The open capability to deploy nuclear weapons is a significant deterrent to large scale conflict and adds considerable weight to any threat of the use of forces.

Politically China already has one of the most coveted and influential positions in the world – a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Traditionally China has abstained from voting on Chapter VII resolutions (authorising the use of force), but has recently begun taking a more active role, voting in favour of Resolution 1441 on Iraq. China has moved away from its approach under Deng Xiaoping of seeking “many of the rights and privileges of a great power without accepting most of the attendant obligations and responsibilities” to actively seeking to promote their economic interests and enhance their security[22]. As they join more international structures, like the WTO and ASEAN, and increase their trade with other countries, China’s diplomatic and political muscle will grow.

The concerns of other nations

Since the growth of China’s potential influence in all areas seems inevitable, the more important question is how will China use this growing influence and power? Will it actively seek to dominate other countries or will it take a more pragmatic cooperative approach? Robert Zoellick expressed this very concern recently at the National Committee on US-China Relations – “For the United States and the world, the essential question is – how will China use its influence”[23]. His concern is whether China will become a “responsible stakeholder” or a “fire-breather”[24]. Although China’s use of its economic influence may cause headaches and nervousness in Wall Street and its use of its political influence may cause consternation in diplomatic circles, both these options are acceptable and preferable to China’s potential use of military force. America for the most part, would prefer China to build and strengthen its relations and its role in the international community, rather than withdraw and isolate itself[25].

So if the concern is not China’s economic or political influence, but rather its growing military potential, we need to understand why this concern has arisen.

China recently appears to have begun a process of rapidly modernising and expanding its military, however due to a lack of transparency in its policies the reasons for this are unclear[26]. The initial impetus for the reform of China’s military came from Deng Xiaoping after the unsuccessful “punitive” war with Vietnam in 1979 showed how unprepared China’s military had become. This led to Deng’s new military doctrine of limited warfare on China’s periphery, which required a more mobile and modern military[27]. The first Gulf War was another eye-opener to the Chinese, demonstrating how important technology was to modern warfare. It was officially reported that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had to now look at tactics from a “technological angle” rather than the traditional “strategic angle.”[28] The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) campaign in Kosovo with its extensive air-campaign and use of precision guided munitions was the final shove. Chinese military spending has increased in both absolute and relative terms since then[29]. The increased military spending has raised concerns in the US and other countries. The 2005 annual report to Congress on the military power of the People’s Republic of China notes that the “pace and scope of China’s military build-up are, already, such as to put regional military balances at risk”[30] America now estimates China as having the third largest military budget in the world, and the largest in Asia. But the US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld believes that no nation threatens China and wonders “Why this growing investment?”[31]

Why this growing investment?

China’s primary concerns and reasons for developing its military appear to be to ensure its territorial integrity and internal security. Unfortunately these are far more complex issues than they appear. Karl Eikenberry elaborately explains some of the problems that China faces:

“The PRC’s land boundaries extend over 22,100 kilometers. The climates and terrains across this expanse include tropical rain forests, deserts, glacial barriers, mountain ranges, coniferous forests, and steppes. China’s neighbors include three powers with whom it has fought in the past 25 years (Russia, India, and Vietnam); the increasingly unstable North Korea; and a host of countries beset with civil strife that has implications for ethnic minorities living within the PRC (Afghanistan, Burma, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan).”[32]

It appears very reasonable that a country this large and diverse would require a large military force for its defence. The strategy of a mobile force prepared for limited warfare on the periphery also makes sense. However there are the two serious problems of China having several outstanding border disputes, and more importantly the issue of Taiwan.

The issue of China’s outstanding border disputes is of concern, since China has already engaged in skirmishes over borders with India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. China’s use of military force, though not direct confrontation, in the South China Sea has also raised concerns – China used its navy to occupy the Spratly Islands as well as Mischief Reef in the 1990’s. China’s interest in the South China Sea is fuelled in part by the potential for large oil deposits in the area[33], but also by the issue of China’s control over its trade routes and coastal waters. China passed the “Law on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas of the Peoples’ Republic of China” in 1992, which essentially extended Chinese sovereignty of 800 000 km² of the West Pacific include most of the South China Sea. Many Asian countries trade routes pass through these waters, including those of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and control over them would allow China to hold these countries hostage to Beijing’s goodwill[34]. If China expands its naval forces so that it may effectively police and control these waterways, it would gain significant influence of countries using them.

Although China has demonstrated that it is willing to use force to secure its borders, it has also actively been settling border disputes through diplomatic means. From 1991, China has settled disputes with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam. At the same time relations with India have also improved considerably, but a formal agreement has not yet been reached.[35] As China’s diplomatic efforts succeed and as these agreements are concluded, the threat of China initiating armed conflict over a border is receding.

The issue of Taiwan may not be so easy to resolve. The Taiwan issue was essentially created when the Chinese nationalist government fled from Mao Zedong’s communists to the island of Taiwan in 1949. China considers Taiwan to be a renegade province that must be re-united with the mainland, by force if necessary. Taiwan has its own democratically elected government, but has not declared itself an independent state and therefore also considers itself part of mainland China.[36] Taiwan with its own democratic government and prosperous economy is reluctant to reunite with China, who is very authoritarian and has a poor human rights record. The pro-independence movement in Taiwan is growing – the current president Chen Shui-bian is very pro-independence, a view that is infuriating mainland China[37]. Since 1996, the number of people who identify themselves as being Taiwanese (rather than Taiwanese and Chinese, or purely Chinese) has been rapidly increasing[38]. The strong ties that Taiwan and America enjoy further complicate the issue. In order to establish formal diplomatic relations with China in the 1970’s the United States had to endorse China’s position that “there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”[39] However at the same time the Taiwan Relations Act was passed by Congress which maintained ties with Taiwan and promised to provide defensive arms to counter a potential Chinese invasion[40]. China insists that Taiwan will be reunited with the mainland and promises to use its military to “resolutely and thoroughly crush”[41] any Taiwanese attempts at independence. The possibility of conflict over Taiwan is of key concern to the region, and the potential for a large scale conflict between China and the United States triggered by Taiwan is of even greater concern. A US-China conflict would seriously damage the world political and economic systems and carries the additional threat of nuclear war. The US Nuclear Posture Review report of 2002 listed China as one of seven possible targets for nuclear attack, most likely in a conflict over Taiwan[42], and a Chinese general recently suggested that “China would engage in a nuclear war with America if it intervenes to defend Taiwan.”[43]

Many in America believe that the only reason China is growing its military is to resolve the Taiwan issue on its terms. Some see China’s strategy as to grow its “power until it over-awes both Taiwan and the United States …[forcing America] to disengage from Taiwan.”[44] The US Department of Defense in of the opinion that China’s military modernisation was in “response to central leadership demands to develop military options for Taiwan scenarios.”[45] A successful takeover of Taiwan would be the one true test and display of China’s dominance over the East Asia and Pacific region – it would be a major “defeat” of US interests in the area and would unequivocally demonstrate China’s ability and willingness to crush any opposition.

Ironically, that which is providing for the increase in military spending, is also reducing the possibility of China using military action – China’s economic dominance. A war with Taiwan would likely cripple China’s economy, through disruption of trade routes and sanctions by other countries, and the possible destruction of Taiwan’s infrastructure. Additionally, stability on the mainland could be compromised by such a campaign, especially if it was unsuccessful or protracted[46]. A peaceful, diplomatic solution is more likely at this stage, barring any rash moves by either side. Considerable progress has been made in improving relations between the two sides – Taiwan is the single largest provider of foreign direct investment to China[47], and China is Taiwan’s main export destination[48]. Taiwan is still unlikely to submit to Chinese rule until they are convinced that their freedoms would be secured, and it may be a while before a solution acceptable to both sides becomes available.

The future use of Chinese military force

The remaining question is whether China is likely to use its military force to dominate the region. China has of late gone to great lengths to emphasise its peaceful intentions, pursuing its so called “Independent Foreign Policy of Peace”[49]. China appears to have come to the realisation that its needs to preserve peace and good relations with its neighbours in order to support and sustain its economic growth. Its official rhetoric repeatedly emphasises China’s wish for “multipolarization”, “boosting the democratization of international relations” and “world peace, stability and development.”[50] More importantly is the use of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence as the basis for relations with other countries. These principles hold special weight since they are attributed to Chairman Mao. The principle’s are as follows:

• Mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;
• Mutual non-aggression;
• Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;
• Equality and mutual benefit; and
• Peaceful co-existence.[51]

If China could abide by these principles, there would be little threat of the use of military power or the attempted dominance over its neighbours. Note however that Taiwan is not covered by these principles, since China considers it part of its territory.

China has been attempting to live up to its new vision of itself and its role in the world. It has been the host to the Six-Nation Talks on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons[52] and has been participating in and joining multilateral organisations, like the United Nations, ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China has also in the past fifteen years ratified key non-proliferation treaties, including the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. [53]

The modernisation of China’s military also has the potential of reducing conflicts with its neighbours. The modernisation programme includes reducing troop numbers, increasing the number of civilian employees, using better educated personnel and strengthening the military legal system[54]. All these initiatives will contribute to a more professional force that is less likely to follow orders blindly. Additionally the leaders would be less inclined to engage in meaningless or badly planned combat, since losses would be far more costly in terms of equipment and training. Together this creates a far more rational and predictable military, and therefore one that poses less of a threat.

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[1] The World Factbook 2004, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, 2004

 [2] “Background Note: China”, US Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm, March 2005

 [3] Bijian, Z. “China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great-Power Status”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005, pg 18

 [4] “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Second Quarter, 2005)”, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/monthlydata/t20050726_402265736.htm, 12 October 2005

 [5] Bijian, Z., op. cit., pg 18

 [6] “Background Note: China”, op. cit.

 [7] Larson, AP, “China’s Role in the World Economic System”, http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rm/2003/27026.htm, 5 November 2003

 [8] Wilson, D. and Purushothaman, R. “Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050”, Global Economics: Paper No: 99, Goldman Sachs, 1 October 2003, pg. 3

 [9] The World Factbook 2004, op. cit.

 [10] “China’s economy”, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/displaybackgrounder.cfm?bg=747710, 2 August 2005

 [11] Ibid.

 [12] “G8 Gleneagles 2005 Participants”, http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1098795092336, 12 October 2005

 [13] “China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace”, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.htm,18 August 2003

 [14] “China in landmark Asean pact”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4051653.stm, 29 November 2004

 [15] “China-Africa Relations”, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18059.htm, 25 April 2002

 [16] Noriega, RF, “China’s Influence in the Western Hemisphere”, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2005/q2/44375.htm, 6 April 2005

 [17] “Bogus fears send the Chinese packing”, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4244565, 2 August 2005

 [18] “China gives ground in textile row”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4564859.stm, 20 May 2005

 [19] “The Constitution Of Japan”, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, 12 October 2005

 [20] The World Factbook 2004, op. cit.

 [21] Eikenberry, KW. “Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability?”, Parameters, Spring 1995

 [22] Medeiros, ES; Fravel MT “China’s New Diplomacy”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003

 [23] Zoellick, RB. “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm, 21 September 2005

 [24] Ibid.

 [25] Ibid.

 [26] Ibid.

 [27] Gregor, AJ. “Qualified Engagement: U.S. China Policy and Security Concerns”, Naval War College Review, vol L11, no 2, sequence 366, Spring 1999

 [28] Eikenberry, KW., op. cit.

 [29] Krawitz, HM. “Modernizing China’s Military: A High-Stakes Gambles?”, Strategic Forum, National Defence University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, no. 204, December 2003

 [30] The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005, pg 13

 [31] Rumsfeld, DH. “Secretary Rumsfeld’s Remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies”, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050604-secdef3002.html, 4 June 2005

 [32] Eikenberry, KW., op. cit.

 [33] Studeman, M. “Calculating China’s Advances in the South China Sea: Identifying the Triggers of Expansionism”, Naval War College Review, sequence 362, Spring 1998

 [34] Gregor, AJ. “China, the United States, and Security Policy in East Asia”, Parameters, Summer 1996

 [35] Medeiros, ES; Fravel MT, op. cit.

 [36] “Country profile: Taiwan”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1285915.stm, 22 September 2005

 [37] “Chapter I: The Security Situation”, China’s National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/I.htm, December 2004

 [38] “Independence debate”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/04/taiwan_flashpoint/html/independence_debate.stm, 12 October 2005

 [39] “Background Note: China”, op. cit.

 [40] “US Role”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/04/taiwan_flashpoint/html/us_role.stm, 12 October 2005

 [41] “Chapter II: National Defense Policy”, China’s National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/II.htm, December 2004

 [42] Van Ness, P. “China’s Response to the Bush Doctrine” in World Policy Journal - Winter 2004/05, pg 40

 [43] “Sizing up the dragon”, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4198701, 21 July 2005

 [44] Garver, J. “Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy” in China Brief, Vol. 5, Issue 15, Jamestown Foundation , 5 July 2005

 [45] The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, op. cit. Executive Summary

 [46] Ibid., pg. 42

 [47] Ibid., pg. 42

 [48] “Country profile: Taiwan”, op. cit.

 [49] “Policies and Activities”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/, 13 October 2005

 [50] “China’s Views on the Development of Multipolarization”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24880.htm, 18 August 2003

 [51] “China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm, 17 November 2000

 [52] “N Korea accord hits first hurdle”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4261284.stm, 20 September 2005

 [53] Medeiros, ES; Fravel MT, op. cit.

 [54] “Chapter III Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics”, China’s National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/III.htm, December 2004